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ABSTRACT 
Remain or Leave? The main hypothesis in this paper is whether political events such 
as Brexit and the Scottish Referendum have any statistically significant impact on 
financial markets. cumulative abnormal returns for FTSE 350 Banks Index have been 
calculated before and after these milestone events. The empirical results show that 
Brexit had a statistically significant negative impact on the market performance of the 
FTSE 350 Banks Index relative to the benchmark index performance. Similarly, the 
Scottish Referendum had a statistically significant positive impact on the same index, 
though at different times and with different magnitudes. A comparison between the two 
referendum shows that markets tend to react more to negative events such as Brexit as 
evidenced by a higher impact on cumulative abnormal returns. This paper also gives a 
brief insight on how a selected group of five sectors have been affected from both of 
the events. Components of this selected group include Life insurance, Construction 
Materials, General Retailers, Household Goods and Real Estate Investment Trusts. 
Keywords: Scottish Independence Referendum, Brexit, Event Study Methodology, 
Cumulative Abnormal Return, UK Banks 
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ÖZET 
 
Kalmak mı, Gitmek mi? Bu makaledeki ana hipotez, Brexit ve İskoç Referandumu gibi 
siyasi olayların finansal piyasalar üzerinde istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir etkisinin olup 
olmadığıdır. FTSE 350 Banklar İndeksinin kümülatif anormal getirileri, bu dönüm 
noktası olaylarından önce ve sonra hesaplanmıştır. Ampirik sonuçlar, Brexit'in FTSE 
350 Banklar İndeksinin piyasa performansı üzerinde kıyaslama endeks performansına 
göre istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir olumsuz etkisi olduğunu göstermektedir. Benzer 
şekilde, İskoç Referandumu, farklı zamanlarda ve farklı büyüklüklerde olsa da aynı 
endeks üzerinde istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir olumlu etkiye sahipti. İki referandum 
arasındaki bir karşılaştırma, piyasaların Brexit gibi olumsuz olaylara daha fazla tepki 
gösterme eğiliminde olduğunu gösteriyor. Bu makale ayrıca, seçilen beş sektörden 
oluşan bir grubun her iki olaydan nasıl etkilendiği hakkında kısa bir fikir vermektedir. 
Bu seçilen grubun bileşenleri arasında Hayat sigortası, Yapı Malzemeleri, Genel 
Perakendeciler, Ev Eşyaları ve Gayrimenkul Yatırım Fonları bulunmaktadır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İskoç Bağımsızlık Referandumu, Brexit, Olay Çalışması 
Metodolojisi, Kümülatif Anormal Getiriler, İngiliz Bankaları 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return analysis with Event Study Methodology has been 
applied to various combinations of Financial world scenarios. Typically, these 
scenarios would include effect of both expected and unexpected news and event and 
their knock-on effects on individual or a group of equites listed on the stock exchanges. 
These events could be in micro level that is stemming from company related news or 
like the ones this paper is going to analyze occurs on national and international level. 
This paper is going to present the effects of 2014 Scottish Independence Vote and 2016 
European Union Membership Referendum (Brexit). Brexit is an acronym formed from 
two words. Br part is for Britain and exit part is for Exit, forming the word Brexit. 
Historical background both of the countries will be provided for a firmer understanding 
of the subject. Political reasoning behind these vote and referendums will be also given 
to shed light to the nature of the environment around these specific events. Economists 
strongly argue that expectations form the world we live in. Investors always try to stay 
ahead of the competition to get better return to the funds they manage. They try to make 
sense of the political and economic environment. They then make their move like a 
chess player calculating all of the possible scenarios for the future unforeseeable 
outcomes. Even the betting companies tried to chip in to this political event and turned 
into financial instrument for their own good. Public was provided with census ratings 
done by credible well-established companies and were also fed odds information from 
the biggest betting company’s statistical expert teams. Due to the fact that these events 
were both going to affect the core of all the economic partnerships. European Union 
was deeply worried about first the Scottish Vote and then Brexit. Scottish vote meant 
that leaving was a better option that being together. This was the cornerstone of the 
European Union fundamentals. Following Scottish Independence Vote rejections 
European Union took a breather, but only in a short time to be confronted with Brexit 
referendum. This time it was going to hurt it more because UK was one of the biggest 
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members of the EU. According to the European Parliament News website (2019) there 
were 751 members of the parliament of which 75 were from UK. UK accounted for 
just above 10 percent of the seats in European Union decision making process. Even if 
the politicians deny the fact that International trade, free movement of citizens, 
education and many more issues can be negotiated between countries, economists 
know very well that all the countries need each other to survive. Flow of money both 
inwards and outwards of a country is generated through trade and ease of doing 
business among countries.  
Scottish Independence Vote and European Union Referendum both put the citizens of 
each country and millions of stakeholders in those countries in a difficult situation. 
Investors and citizens had difficult time comprehending how will their future will be, 
this still stands as of 2019 during the time of this thesis. 
The hypothesis of this study to find out if the Scottish Vote and Brexit Referendum is 
bad news for the banks listed in FTSE. If negative abnormal return is seen following 
the calculations, it would be concluded that these events hurt the banking sector around 
the event dates. 
In chapter two, literature review will be provided. Author of this paper has observed 
that there are numerous works that focus on different aspects of referendum effects on 
various sectors of both financial firms and corporation working on international arena. 
However, author did not come across a comparative analysis of two referendums with 
regards to Cumulative Abnormal Returns. Author believes that these comparison works 
need to be extended to future event dates and their effects should be measured for 
public education because when people vote sometimes, they are not aware of the full 
consequences of their actions. At the time of the writing, UK is still in European Union 
and negotiations are continuing between parties. European elections are approaching 
and it is causing UK a dilemma on if she should be included in an election that in the 
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future, she might not be a part of. European Union on the other has extended United 
Kingdom's leave date until 31st of October 2019. This date could be the next event date 
for further analysis. It has been more than 3 years with no agreement on how UK will 
leave EU. It is a tough ride for UK. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Dolley, J. C. (1933). plays an essential role in the subject of Event Study Methodology 
as he is believed to be the first one to use event study methodology in his research of 
common-stock split-ups in companies listed in the New York Stock Exchange between 
the years 1920 and 1930. Keeping in mind the information management opportunities 
of his time, he had great difficulty gathering the information needed to create his data 
set.  He consulted Poor’s Manual and Moody’s Manual for the history of the listed 
stock. Finally, he gathered the price quotations from the New York Times. There were 
174 split-ups of which 79 were impossible to get necessary price quotations. He then 
sent a detailed questionnaire to each of the corporations for more information resulting 
with 63 replies.  He then charted number of split-ups against the years. He found out 
that when viewed with the level of business activity and stock prices of the mentioned 
years, the frequency of split-ups was in correlation with each other. Also, the effect of 
the recession years of 1924 and 1927 were clearly visible on his research. 
Some academics claim Dolley J.C. was the first one to use Event Study Methodology 
in the field but it was Eugene F. Fama. (1970). who made it popular. According to 
Fama’s Efficient Hypothesis, there are three types of hypothesis where he explains how 
available information to both general public and sneaky insiders play part in security 
prices. These are, Weak, Semi-Strong and Strong forms. Brexit and Scottish Vote 
results were announced publicly with no chance of anyone having a prior knowledge 
of the result. This information release style suggests that these events can be considered 
as semi-strong form. 
CAZAN, S. A. (2017). has analyzed the Brexit implications over the eleven English 
banks. She has reached a conclusion of following the post event windows after 23rd of 
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June 2016, cumulative abnormal returns for these banks have dropped significantly 
with the negative market impact. She kept her estimation window with 221 days before 
the 23rd of June 2016. She has cited Khotari and Warner (2006) for their view on the 
best estimation window to be below 12 months period due to the fact that it takes into 
account specification, power against types of hypothesis and finally sensitivity. She has 
also pointed another valuable fact about Greenland’s leave of EU on 1985. According 
to the article of Maïa De La Baume (2016) on Politico.eu website Greenland became a 
member of European Economic Community in 1973 through its ties with Denmark. 
They voted two times against EU one in 1972 before joining and one in ten years later 
in 1982 which was finally actioned in 1985 with Greenland becoming a Overseas 
Countries and Territories (OCT) of the EU. Greenland’s main issue with European 
Union was with losing control over fishing rights. 
Tihana Škrinjarić. (2019). examined the effects of Brexit from a different point of view. 
Brexit has not only affected UK but also due to the fact that UK is one of the top 
financial centers in the world it had effect on Central and Eastern European (CEE) and 
South and Eastern European (SEE) stock markets and came up with mixed results with 
the cumulative abnormal returns but highlights her findings on significant volatility 
series. The countries and stock markets that she has analyzed were BELEX, BETI, 
BIRS, BUX, CROBEX, PFTS, PX, SAX, SBITOP, SOFIX, and WIG (corresponding 
countries: Serbia, Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Ukraine, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Poland respectively). The event of 
Brexit was not only contained in UK but had knock on effects on the rest of the world 
in form of increased volatility.  
Nida Abdioğlu, & Sinan Aytekin. (2016). focused on the role of macroeconomic policy 
announcements on the Turkish Banks’ stock returns from the point of view Cumulative. 
They have investigated the 24 monetary policy decisions of the Monetary Policy 
Committee on 12 deposit banks listed on Borsa Istanbul Banks Index (XBANK). They 
6 
concluded that Turkish deposit banks gave inconsistent results since in some months 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns were positive and in some were negative. Clearly 
monetary policy decisions had an impact on the banks return during these years. 
Ramiah, V. (1), Pham, H. N. A. (1), & Moosa, I. (2). (n.d.). (2017) investigated the 
sectoral effects of Brexit on the British Economy. They used event study methodology 
to assess the effect of Brexit relative to anticipation and reality. A brief summary of the 
most significantly affected sectors they have discovered were household goods and 
home construction were hit by 10-day Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR10) of -
16.81% with t statistics of -5.22 because it gauges housing markets tension against 
Brexit. Construction and materials sector resulted with CAR10 of -11.06% with t 
statistics -5.21. Real-estate investment trusts had CAR10 of -12.19% with t statistics -
5.26. Banking sector was measured with CAR10 of -15.37% with t statistics of -4.59, 
due to the concerns about passporting rights, free movement of capital and London 
being the most active financial center in Euro Zone Area. Uncertainty about the future 
put down General Retailers sector with CAR10 of -10.62% with t statistics -5.02 with 
expectation of lower future customer spending. 
Oehler, A., Horn, M., & Wendt, S. (2017) focused on Brexit effects of a possible 
trouble on the tariff free trade on firms which serve domestic and international 
customers. They brought a close-up view to event studies. They have worked with daily 
returns cumulative abnormal returns while also tackling a faster pace environment in 
calculating 5-minute returns which was a highly volatile market at the time of the event. 
According to the research that is compiled for this paper, they are the only ones who 
analyzed 5-minute returns for an event. This could be due to the advent of the 
sophisticated price reporting systems we have today which was not available for 
decades of studies that was done before. They have observed negative abnormal returns 
from the crash in the first three five minutes candles on the event day. They have arrived 
to a conclusion on firms with domestic sales that were not subject of international tariff 
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uncertainty of Brexit Referendum have experienced a higher negative abnormal return 
that firms with international clientele.  
Tielmann, A., & Schiereck, D. (2017). viewed the effects of Brexit Referendum on the 
logistic companies. Leaving European Union would mean movement of goods and 
capital would need to be renegotiated and border controls would be reinstated between 
United Kingdom and European Union. They have used 107 logistic companies from 
continental EU countries and United Kingdom. 21 of those were British companies and 
the rest of the 86 companies from the member countries of European Union. Their 
findings showed a highly significant negative market reaction for both UK and 
European companies. However, they point out that UK companies are significantly 
more affected from the Brexit Referendum result. This is due to the fact that EU 
companies would still continue to enjoy tariff free trade among EU companies. They 
would only need to negotiate with single country that is UK, vice versa, UK would 
need to negotiate with 27 countries. Which at the time of writing following 3 years of 
Brexit event is in debate in current UK Parliament? 
Schiereck, D., Kiesel, F., & Kolaric, S. (2016) compared the stock and CDS (Credit 
Default Swap) spread reactions to the Brexit Referendum to the bankruptcy filing of 
Lehman Brothers. This comparison entailed 87 banks for Lehman collapse of which 
were 40 EU and 47 Non-EU banks with 94 banks for Brexit of which 35 were EU and 
59 were Non-EU Banks. Their research shows that Lehman Brothers collapse 
announcement gave way to a weakly significant negative average Cumulated 
Abnormal Returns. They explain this result with the devastating knock-on effects of 
the collapse on the general market indices. Therefore, when put against their market 
indices, bank did not look in severe condition. They came up with conclusion that 
Brexit had a worse effect on mainly EU Financial Institutions which had a significant 
share price decline. On the CDS side, they have found that Lehman case, Non-EU 
banks were affected more whereas in Brexit case it was the other way around. Brexit 
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was confined to EU Banks. They concluded as; Brexit was not another Lehman 
moment for banks. They explained further that; financial market is more robust in 
dealing with uncertainty against financial system more than before. 
Jackowicz, K., Kozłowski, Ł., & Podgórski, B. (2017). took a country specific case, 
Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE), Poland, to test against Brexit Referendum Vote. They 
tested the hypothesis of price decline caused by the referendum was not severe for firms 
dependent on European Markets. They gathered sample data of 116 companies listed 
in WSE which excludes financial entities. They have found out that investor reactions 
were uniform with regard to the firms’ degree of international client portfolio. 
Lee, S., & Connolly, D. J. (2010) have worked with IT related news events effect on 
hotels, restaurants and casinos between years 1996 and 2006. Their purpose to uncover 
how the financial markets perceived the IT news regarding hospitality companies. This 
sample period is the widest period the author of this paper came across at the time of 
the writing. They have elected to represent companies with more than 70 percent of the 
market capitalization. Hotel sector was represented with Hilton, Marriot, Starwood, 
Choice and Four Seasons. Restaurants were represented with McDonald, Yum Brand, 
Darden, Wendy's and Brinker. Casinos were represented with Harrah's, MGM, Mirage, 
Sands, Station and Boyd. They had to classify what would count as an event marker 
through an intensive classification of the IT news category. Starting with initial 22 
categories, they consolidated the scope to 8 categories with more than 5 news item and 
created a catch all category for the remaining news, totaling the category number to 9. 
Guest Services, IT infrastructure, Distribution/E-commerce, Sales, Awards, Personnel, 
Environmental, Supply Chain Management and Accounting formed the top 8 
categories. News that were eligible for study were initially stood at 294 then 
consolidated to 230 dues to the rule that two news that occur within 10 days would be 
discarded. They released their finding as; no hotel company shows significant 
Cumulated Abnormal Returns either positive or negative, in restaurants analysis only 
9 
Brinker showed a positive Cumulated abnormal return and finally no casino showed 
positive Cumulated Abnormal Returns at 5 percent significance level. 
Abadie, A., & Gardeazabal, J. (2001). have focused on the economic cost of terrorism 
by ETA on Basque Country. They had a difficult task on constructing control group 
share portfolios due to the fact that just because the company is residing in that that 
particular address would not mean it was going to be badly affected by the attacks. The 
address selection for that company could have been purely for tax purposes. They also 
analyzed the event of truce and its effects. They came to a conclusion that markets did 
welcome truce positively whereas attacks did not bring in positive returns for the 
investors. Cumulative abnormal returns have been calculated for Basque portfolio and 
Non-Basque Portfolio. They showed during truce period Basque portfolio over-
performed Non-Basque Portfolio with positive cumulative abnormal returns. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
COUNTRY INFORMATION 
2.1. Scottish Independence Votes 
Figure 2.1. 1 Scottish Votes 
 
Sides of the Scottish Referendum: 
According to an article on The Guardian (2014) Scottish independence: everything you 
need to know about the vote, Scottish citizens were asked “Should Scotland be an 
independent country” 
Yes Campaigners: “Yes Scotland should be an independent country” 
Yes Campaigners were after the ability to decide where Scottish money was going to 
be spent on their own. Oil reserves were part of the debate. Welfare spending, pensions, 
childcare plans were on top of the agenda for Yes Campaigners. No to spending on 
nuclear weapons even took its place on the car stickers of the yes supporters. 
 
LEAVE: 
1,617,989 
45%
REMAIN:
2,001,926 
55%
SCOTTISH VOTES
11 
No Campaigners: “No Scotland should be an independent country” 
No campaigners pointed their fingers on the possible currency problem if they are 
separated from the UK. Aging population was another important issue for them leading 
to the question if needed how country will pay for its public services. They questioned 
the strength of the oil reserves and heavy dependence of the country on them. They 
coined the term Better Together which also was on every news channel outlet and was 
not only embraced in Scotland but in UK.
2.2. Brexit Referendum Votes 
The press release from BBC website (2016) with article named EU Referendum Results 
were as follows: 
Figure 2.2. 1 Brexit Votes 
Electorate were asked "Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European 
Union or leave the European Union" 
REMAIN; 
16,141,241 ; 
48%
LEAVE; 
17,410,742 ; 
52%
BREXIT VOTES 
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Yes Campaigners: "Yes the United Kingdom should leave the European Union" 
Timothy B. Lee (2016) provides a list of arguments for yes campaigners. The top 
argument was the sovereignty issue. UK should take matters into its own hands and 
decide on its own without any intervention from European Union. EU Regulations were 
believed to be a burden for UK on its way of living. Corporates interest were not catered 
for under EU and radical reforms were not being able to put in place. EU future looks 
dark with finally failing members states. Free movement of people, excessive 
immigration from member states to UK is causing work problems in UK, taking away 
jobs from UK citizens. UK should keep the money it sends to European Union which 
is around £13 billion a year but getting back as rebates a far less around one of third of 
the money that is sent. 
No Campaigners: "No the United Kingdom should remain a member of the European 
Union" 
Keith Pilbeam (2016) gives a description of the benefits UK is enjoying in EU 
membership. All tariff free trade agreement meant 45 percent of the UK trade was tied 
up in EU, UK's biggest export customer. Passporting rights meant financial institutions 
would serve customers from all member states freely with no restriction. Domestic 
investment in UK automatically included access to 27 EU member states which could 
be used for exporting goods and services. Foreign direct investment chooses UK for its 
competitive economy and tariff-free access to EU. Immigrations brings in EU citizens 
with high skills who also pay taxes, compensating the skill shortage in specific fields 
in UK. Freedom of movement of capital and labour, meaning ability to take up work 
in EU member states. Money can move from UK to EU with no restriction. Jobs will 
be lost if UK leaves EU due to lower foreign direct investment, lower exports. Cost of 
living would rise with the tariffs on imports to UK. Being an EU member provides 
power in international politics.  
13 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Samples for the computations were gathered from Investing.com (2019) Historical 
prices of daily closing prices for FTSE 100 (FTSE) and FTSE 350 Banks 
(FTNMX8350). FTSE 100 in formed from the top performing companies in UK. The 
constituents of this 100 companies are exhibited in the appendix section. FTSE 350 
Banks is an index with a ticker FTNMX8350 is formed from the 8 banks listed on 
FTSE, these are Barclays (BARC), BGEO Group (BGEO), CYBG (CYBGC), HSBC 
(HSBA), Lloyds Banking (LLOY), Metro Bank (MTRO), RBS PLC(RBS), Standard 
Chartered (STAN). Along with these data the following sectors have also been 
examined for comparison purposes. FTSE 350 Life Insurance (FTNMX8570), FTSE 
350 Construction Materials (FTNMX2350), FTSE 350 General Retailers 
(FTNMX5370), FTSE 350 Household Goods (FTNMX3720) and FTSE 350 Reit 
(FTNMX8670). 
Event Date is the actual date when the events in this case referendums took place. For 
Scottish Vote, event date was 18 September 2014 and Brexit Vote, the event date was 
23 June 2016. 
Event Window is the time frame where the event study methodology is examined. The 
time frame selected for this study is 10 working days before and after the selected 
events to compute the Cumulative abnormal return. Event window for Scottish Vote 
was between 04 September 2014 (10 days before event date 18 September 2014) and 
02 October 2014 (10 days after event date 18 September 2014). For Brexit, event 
window as between 09 June 2016 (10 days before event date 23 June 2016) and 07 July 
2016 (10 days after event date 23 June 2016). 
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Estimation period is the time were forecasted and real returns have been compared. An 
estimation period of 30 days before and after the event has also been analyzed for this 
purpose. Daily returns have been calculated this period. For Scottish Vote, estimation 
period was between 06 August 2014 and 30 October 2014. For Brexit, estimation 
period was between 11 May 2016 and 04 August 2016. 
3 years prior to the event data has been collected and beta and intercept for the 
particular stocks have been calculated. For Scottish Vote, 3-year period was between 
08 November 2011 and 30 October 2014. For Brexit Vote, 3-year period was between 
14 August 2013 and 04 August 2016. 
 Beta and intercept have been calculated by using linear regression of 3 years historical 
daily FTSE 100 returns against each of the FTSE 350 sector returns listed on Table 3.1 
below.  
Table 3. 1 3 years Beta and Intercept Table 
 
Having a beta of 1 shows the returns of respective sectors are correlated with the FTSE 
100 index. A beta over 1 means, the sector is still correlated with the benchmark of 
FTSE 100 but outperforms it and has more volatility. In this study, author has not come 
up with a negative Beta. A Beta of less than one and above zero means, the sector is 
still correlated with the benchmark but the following of the returns of FTSE 100 will 
be less than the actual line of the FTSE 100. 
BETA INTERCEPT BETA INTERCEPT
FTNMX8350 Banks 1.32 4x10
-5
1.18 -57x10
-5
FTNMX8570 Life Insurance 1.34 64x10
-5
1.32 10x10
-5
FTNMX2350 Construction Materials 1.32 5x10
-5
1.15 45x10
-5
FTNMX5370 General Retailers 0.91 50x10
-5
0.82 -3x10
-5
FTNMX3720 Household Goods 0.88 68x10
-5
0.88 58x10
-5
FTNMX8670 Reit 0.89 41x10
-5
0.90 29x10
-5
Scottish 3yr Brexit 3yr
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From Scottish Vote, it can be seen that Banks, Life Insurance and Construction 
Materials have a beta of over 1 leading to a conclusion of outperformance versus FTSE 
100, whereas the strength of General Retailers, Household Goods and REIT are still 
correlated with FTSE 100 but less powerful than the previously mentioned group. 
From Brexit Vote, it can be seen that the betas are different due to the fact that it covers 
a later date interval. Banks beta has fallen from 1.31 to 1.18, Life Insurance from 1.33 
to 1.32 and Construction Materials from 1.32 to 1.15. This group still considered as 
outperformers since it is above 1, the but their strength are weaker. The scenario is the 
same for previous group of General Retailers, Household Goods and REIT. 
Intercepts are calculated as a part of the linear regression equation but as it can be seen 
from the table above all of them are around zero. In order for them to be visible, author 
has provided digits to the further number above 0 so that it will not be regarded as zero. 
Averages of cumulative abnormal returns were calculated following the 30 days period 
after the event date. Also, for this 30-day period standard deviation has been calculated. 
T stats has been calculated with the average cumulative returns and the standard 
deviation for this period. 
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Table 3. 2 Scottish Votes CAR Descriptive Statistics  
 
Descriptive Statistics allows the reader recognize the central tendency, dispersion and 
skewness of a set of data. Date used in this study is a sample of larger set of data. 
Sample Mean is calculated by the arithmetic average of the sample data. 
 
Means calculated for Scottish Vote are above zero on all of the sectors. On the other 
hand, means for Brexit Vote all lie below zero. 
There appears to be no Mode in all of the sectors listed above for both the Votes. No 
one of the entries repeatedly to be considered as mode. 
Range is a measure of dispersion., that calculates the difference between Maximum 
value and Minimum value. For Scottish Vote, range of Construction Materials is on the 
lead with 8.36% only followed by the Banks with 7.2%. Whereas on Brexit Vote, range 
Scottish Votes CAR 
Descriptive Statistics
Mean 1.84% 1.55% 0.72% 0.10% 1.65% 1.71%
Standard Error 28x10
-4
12x10
-4
21x10
-4
14x10
-4
12x10
-4
24x10
-4
Median 1.24% 1.53% 0.94% 0.27% 1.76% 1.23%
Standard Deviation 220x10
-4
95x10
-4
166x10
-4
111x10
-4
94x10
-4
185x10
-4
Sample Variance 5x10
-4
1x10
-4
3x10
-4
1x10
-4
1x10
-4
3x10
-4
Kurtosis -1.07 -0.71 0.54 1.43 -0.05 -0.48
Skewness 0.56 0.04 -0.50 -0.90 -0.19 0.77
Range 7.26% 3.98% 8.36% 5.70% 4.80% 6.56%
Minimum -1.33% -0.21% -3.96% -3.62% -0.74% -1.01%
Maximum 5.93% 3.78% 4.41% 2.08% 4.06% 5.54%
Count 61 61 61 61 61 61
REITBanks 
Life 
Insurance
Construction 
Materials
General 
Retailers
Household 
Goods
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of banks are 17%. It is clearly visible that range of all of the sectors are higher on Brexit 
Vote. 
Skewness is a part of the measurement of symmetry of a distribution. Zero skewness 
meaning a symmetric distribution. Positive skewness is for cases where mean is greater 
than the median and negative skewness is vice versa.  
For Scottish Vote; Banks, Life Insurance and Reit are the sectors with Positive 
Skewness and Construction Materials, General Retailers, Household Goods have 
negative skewness. 
For Brexit Vote; All of the sectors have negative skewness. 
Kurtosis examines how peaked the distribution is when compared with normal 
distribution. Both of the Votes results show a value less than 3 meaning they are 
platykurtic, where the distribution. is less peaked than normal distribution. 
Table 3. 3 Brexit Votes CAR Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
Brexit Votes CAR 
Descriptive Statistics
Mean -0.24% -5.73% -2.65% -7.77% -5.16% -9.64%
Standard Error 65x10
-4
92x10
-4
44x10
-4
101x10
-4
79x10
-4
103x10
-4
Median -0.14% -2.36% -1.52% -3.29% -1.76% -4.44%
Standard Deviation 504x10
-4
715x10-4 345x10-4 787x10-4 617x10-4 807x10-4
Sample Variance 25x10
-4
51x10
-4
12x10
-4
62x10
-4
38x10
-4
65x10
-4
Kurtosis -1.35 -1.43 -1.38 -1.73 -1.90 -1.53
Skewness -0.15 -0.18 -0.34 -0.10 0.00 -0.28
Range 17.09% 23.64% 11.34% 24.53% 16.46% 25.84%
Minimum -9.91% -19.38% -9.61% -21.13% -13.18% -25.72%
Maximum 7.18% 4.26% 1.73% 3.40% 3.29% 0.12%
Count 61 61 61 61 61 61
REITBanks
Life 
Insurance
Construction 
Materials
General 
Retailers
Household 
Goods
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
4.1. Results of Scottish Independence Votes 
4.1.1. Banks 
Figure 4.1.1. 1 Scottish Votes, Banks CAR 
 
 
Table 4.1.1. 1 Scottish Votes, Banks CAR Statistics 
 
 
30 days estimation period prior to the event starts on 06/08/2014 and 30 days after the 
event ends in 30/10/2014.  3-year Beta has been calculated for dates between 
08/11/2011 and 30/10/2014. 3-year beta has been found as 1.31980. Intercept was 
found to be 0.0000413. 
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30 DAYS 10 DAYS
AVERAGE 3.70% 2.01%
ST DEV S 1.58% 0.59%
TSTAT 2.34 3.39
PROB 1.32% 0.40%
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Based on Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), FTSE 350 Banks daily returns has 
been estimated using the calculated 3-year Beta. The difference between the estimated 
FTSE 350 Banks daily returns and the actual returns is the calculated abnormal return. 
 
Basing our forecast period 30 days before the event, cumulative abnormal return has 
been calculated until 30 days after the event. 
 
Cumulative abnormal return starts with zero at 30 days before the event, which 
increases to 1,24% on the day of the event and peaks at 2,55% at 10 days after the 
event. Finally, it declines to 2,06% 30 days after the event. This empirical analysis 
suggests that the event had an impact on the FTSE 350 Banks index returns. However, 
the results have to be verified through hypothesis testing, where the null hypothesis is 
Cumulative Abnormal Return is equal to zero. 
 
H0 =CAR= 0, Null hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero 
H1 = CAR ≠ 0, Alternate hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is not equal 
to zero 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 30 
day of following the event date to find 3.70%.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 1.58%. 
 
T Statistics has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as 2.34. 
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Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 1.32% probability.  As a 
result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 95% confidence interval and conclude that 
Cumulative Abnormal Return is significantly different than zero. 
 
While analyzing the evolution of Cumulative abnormal returns following the event 
date, it has been observed that cumulative abnormal return has peak 10 days after the 
event. Following this finding, the same study has been employed on the 10-day period. 
 
10 days observation period following to the event date ends on 02/10/2014 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 10 
day of following the event date to find 2.01%.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 0.59%. 
 
T Statistics’ has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as 3.39. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 0.40% probability.  As a 
result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 99% confidence interval and conclude that 
Cumulative Abnormal Return is significantly different than zero. 
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4.1.2. Life Insurance Companies 
Figure 4.1.2. 1 Scottish Votes, Life Insurance CAR 
 
 
Table 4.1.2. 1 Scottish Votes, Life Insurance CAR Statistics 
 
 
Cumulative abnormal return starts with zero at 30 days before the event, which 
increases to 0,28% on the day of the event. In order to compare with banking sector, 
10 days after the event time CAR is found to be at 1,62%. It continues to rise up to 
3,78% 30 days after the event. This empirical analysis suggests that the event had an 
impact on the FTSE 350 Life Insurance index returns. However, the results have to be 
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ST DEV S 0.86% 0.85%
TSTAT 2.44 1.59
PROB 1.06% 7.30%
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verified through hypothesis testing, where the null hypothesis is Cumulative Abnormal 
Return is equal to zero. 
 
H0 =CAR= 0, Null hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero 
H1 = CAR ≠ 0, Alternate hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is not equal 
to zero 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 30 
day of following the event date to find 2,09 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 0,86 %. 
 
T Statistics has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as 2,44. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 1,06 % probability.  As 
a result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 95 % confidence interval and conclude 
that Cumulative Abnormal Return is significantly different than zero. 
 
While analyzing the evolution of Cumulative abnormal returns following the event 
date, it has been observed that FTSE Banks had a peak cumulative abnormal return 10 
days after the event. Following this finding, the same study has been employed on 
FTSE Life Insurance index on the 10-day period. 
 
10 days observation period following to the event date ends on 02/10/2014 
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In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 10 
day of following the event date to find 1,35 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 0,85 %. 
 
T Statistics’ has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as 1,59. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 7,30 % probability We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis, as a result we cannot prove that cumulative abnormal 
return is actually different than zero. 
4.1.3. Construction Materials 
Figure 4.1.3. 1 Scottish Votes, Construction Materials CAR 
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Table 4.1.3. 1 Scottish Votes, Construction Materials CAR Statistics 
 
 
Cumulative abnormal return starts with zero at 30 days before the event, which 
increases to 1,39% on the day of the event. In order to compare with banking sector, 
10 days after the event time CAR is found to be at 1,58%. It drops down to 0,04% 30 
days after the event. This empirical analysis suggests that the event had an impact on 
the FTSE 350 Life Insurance index returns. However, the results have to be verified 
through hypothesis testing, where the null hypothesis is Cumulative Abnormal Return 
is equal to zero. 
 
H0 =CAR= 0, Null hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero 
H1 = CAR ≠ 0, Alternate hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is not equal 
to zero 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 30 
day of following the event date to find 0,01 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 1,62 %. 
 
T Statistics has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as 0,0034. 
30 DAYS 10 DAYS
AVERAGE 0.01% 1.32%
ST DEV S 1.62% 0.65%
TSTAT 0.0034 2.04
PROB 49.86% 3.60%
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Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 48,98 % probability. We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis, as a result we cannot prove that cumulative abnormal 
return is actually different than zero. 
 
While analyzing the evolution of Cumulative abnormal returns following the event 
date, it has been observed that FTSE Banks had a peak cumulative abnormal return 10 
days after the event. Following this finding, the same study has been employed on 
FTSE Life Insurance index on the 10-day period. 
 
10 days observation period following to the event date ends on 02/10/2014 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 10 
day of following the event date to find 1.32 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 0,65 %. 
 
T Statistics’ has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as 2,04. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 3,60 % probability. As a 
result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 99% confidence interval and conclude that 
Cumulative Abnormal Return is significantly different than zero. 
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4.1.4. General Retailers 
Figure 4.1.4. 1 Scottish Votes, General Retailers CAR 
 
 
Table 4.1.4. 1 Scottish Votes, General Retailers CAR Statistics 
 
 
Cumulative abnormal return starts with zero at 30 days before the event, which drops 
to -0,60% on the day of the event and drops more to -1,32 % at 10 days after the event. 
Finally, it increases to -0,54 % 30 days after the event. This empirical analysis suggests 
that the event had an impact on the FTSE 350 General Retailers index returns. 
However, the results have to be verified through hypothesis testing, where the null 
hypothesis is Cumulative Abnormal Return is equal to zero. 
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H0 =CAR= 0, Null hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero 
H1 = CAR ≠ 0, Alternate hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is not equal 
to zero 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 30 
day of following the event date to find -0,52 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 1,06 %. 
 
T Statistics has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as -0,49. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 68,46 % probability.  We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis, as a result we cannot prove that cumulative abnormal 
return is actually different than zero. 
 
While analyzing the evolution of Cumulative abnormal returns following the event 
date, it has been observed that FTSE Banks had a peak cumulative abnormal return 10 
days after the event. Following this finding, the same study has been employed on 
FTSE Life Insurance index on the 10-day period. 
 
10 days observation period following to the event date ends on 02/10/2014 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
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An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 10 
day of following the event date to find -0,10 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 0,75 %. 
 
T Statistics’ has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as -0,13. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 55,20 % probability.  We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis, as a result we cannot prove that cumulative abnormal 
return is actually different than zero. 
 
4.1.5. Household Goods 
Figure 4.1.5. 1 Scottish Votes, Household Goods CAR 
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Table 4.1.5. 1 Scottish Votes, Household CAR Statistics 
 
 
Cumulative abnormal return starts with zero at 30 days before the event, which 
increases to 2,33% on the day of the event and drops to 2,20 % at 10 days after the 
event. Finally, it climbs to 2,91 % 30 days after the event. This empirical analysis 
suggests that the event had an impact on the FTSE 350 Household Goods index returns. 
However, the results have to be verified through hypothesis testing, where the null 
hypothesis is Cumulative Abnormal Return is equal to zero. 
 
H0 =CAR= 0, Null hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero 
H1 = CAR ≠ 0, Alternate hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is not equal 
to zero 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 30 
day of following the event date to find 2,06 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 0,74 %. 
 
T Statistics has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as 2,79. 
30 DAYS 10 DAYS
AVERAGE 2.06% 1.89%
ST DEV S 0.74% 0.53%
TSTAT 2.79 3.58
PROB 0.47% 0.30%
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Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 0,47 % probability.  As 
a result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 99 % confidence interval and conclude 
that Cumulative Abnormal Return is significantly different than zero. 
 
While analyzing the evolution of Cumulative abnormal returns following the event 
date, it has been observed that FTSE Banks had a peak cumulative abnormal return 10 
days after the event. Following this finding, the same study has been employed on 
FTSE Life Insurance index on the 10-day period. 
 
10 days observation period following to the event date ends on 02/10/2014 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 10 
day of following the event date to find 1,89 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 0,53 %. 
 
T Statistics’ has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as 3,58. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 0,30 % probability.  As 
a result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 99 % confidence interval and conclude 
that Cumulative Abnormal Return is significantly different than zero. 
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4.1.6. Real-estate Investments  
Figure 4.1.6. 1 Scottish Votes, REIT CAR 
 
 
Table 4.1.6. 1 Scottish Votes, REIT CAR Statistics 
 
 
Cumulative abnormal return starts with zero at 30 days before the event, which 
increases to 0,24% on the day of the event rises slightly to 0,59 % at 10 days after the 
event. Finally, it reaches to 5,45 % 30 days after the event. This empirical analysis 
suggests that the event had an impact on the FTSE 350 Reit index returns. However, 
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the results have to be verified through hypothesis testing, where the null hypothesis is 
Cumulative Abnormal Return is equal to zero. 
 
H0 =CAR= 0, Null hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero 
H1 = CAR ≠ 0, Alternate hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is not equal 
to zero 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 30 
day of following the event date to find 1,90 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 2,23 %. 
 
T Statistics has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as 0,85. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 20,07 % probability. We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis, as a result we cannot prove that cumulative abnormal 
return is actually different than zero. 
 
While analyzing the evolution of Cumulative abnormal returns following the event 
date, it has been observed that FTSE Banks had a peak cumulative abnormal return 10 
days after the event. Following this finding, the same study has been employed on 
FTSE Life Insurance index on the 10-day period. 
 
10 days observation period following to the event date ends on 02/10/2014 
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In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 10 
day of following the event date to find 0,37%.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 0,46 %. 
 
T Statistics’ has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as 0,81. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 21,96 % probability.  We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis, as a result we cannot prove that cumulative abnormal 
return is actually different than zero. 
4.2 Results for Brexit Referendum 
4.2.1. Banks 
Figure 4.2.1. 1 Brexit Votes, Banks CAR
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Table 4.2.1. 1 Brexit Votes, Banks CAR Statistics 
 
 
30 days estimation period prior to the event starts on 11/05/2016 and 30 days after the 
event ends in 04/08/2016.  3-year Beta has been calculated for dates between 
14/08/2013 and 04/08/2016. 3-year beta has been found as 1.18355. Intercept has been 
found -0.000572803 
 
Based on Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), FTSE 350 Banks daily returns has 
been estimated using the calculated 3-year Beta. The difference between the estimated 
FTSE 350 Banks daily returns and the actual returns is the calculated abnormal return. 
 
Basing our forecast period 30 days before the event, cumulative abnormal return has 
been calculated until 30 days after the event. 
 
Cumulative abnormal return starts with zero at 30 days before the event, which 
increases to 7,18% on the day of the event and peaks at -9,31% at 10 days after the 
event. Finally, it rose to -1,48% 30 days after the event. This empirical analysis 
suggests that the event had an impact on the FTSE 350 Banks index returns. However, 
the results have to be verified through hypothesis testing, where the null hypothesis is 
Cumulative Abnormal Return is equal to zero. 
30 DAYS 10 DAYS
AVERAGE -4.80% -5.96%
ST DEV S 2.45% 3.49%
TSTAT -1.96 -1.70
PROB 2.97% 6.12%
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H0 =CAR= 0, Null hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero 
H1 = CAR ≠ 0, Alternate hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is not equal 
to zero 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 30 
day of following the event date to find -4.80%.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 2.45%. 
T Statistics has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as -1.96. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 2.97% probability.  As a 
result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 95% confidence interval and conclude that 
Cumulative Abnormal Return is significantly different than zero. 
 
While analyzing the evolution of Cumulative abnormal returns following the event 
date, it has been observed that cumulative abnormal return has peak 10 days after the 
event. Following this finding, the same study has been employed on the 10-day period. 
 
10 days observation period following to the event date ends on 07/07/2016 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
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An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 10 
day of following the event date to find -5.96%.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 3.49%. 
 
T Statistics’ has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as -1.70. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 6.12% probability. We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis, as a result we cannot prove that cumulative abnormal 
return is actually different than zero. 
4.2.2. Life Insurance Companies 
Figure 4.2.2. 1 Brexit Votes, Life Insurance CAR 
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Table 4.2.2. 1 Brexit Votes, Life Insurance CAR Statistics 
 
 
Cumulative abnormal return starts with zero at 30 days before the event, which 
increases to 1,79% on the day of the event and drops down dramatically to -18,70 % at 
10 days after the event. Finally, rises to -8,63 % 30 days after the event. This empirical 
analysis suggests that the event had an impact on the FTSE 350 Life Insurance index 
returns. However, the results have to be verified through hypothesis testing, where the 
null hypothesis is Cumulative Abnormal Return is equal to zero. 
 
H0 =CAR= 0, Null hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero 
H1 = CAR ≠ 0, Alternate hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is not equal 
to zero 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 30 
day of following the event date to find -12.47 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 2,99 %. 
 
30 DAYS 10 DAYS
AVERAGE -12.47% -12.65%
ST DEV S 2.99% 4.26%
TSTAT -4.17 -2.97
PROB 0.01% 0.78%
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T Statistics has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as -4,17. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 0,01 % probability.  As 
a result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 99 % confidence interval and conclude 
that Cumulative Abnormal Return is significantly different than zero. 
 
While analyzing the evolution of Cumulative abnormal returns following the event 
date, it has been observed that FTSE Banks had a peak cumulative abnormal return 10 
days after the event. Following this finding, the same study has been employed on 
FTSE Life Insurance index on the 10-day period. 
 
10 days observation period following to the event date ends on 07/07/2016 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 10 
day of following the event date to find -12,65 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 4,26 %. 
 
T Statistics’ has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as -2,97. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 0,78 % probability.  As 
a result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 99 % confidence interval and conclude 
that Cumulative Abnormal Return is significantly different than zero. 
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4.2.3. Construction Materials 
Figure 4.2.3. 1 Brexit Votes, Construction Materials CAR 
 
 
Table 4.2.3. 1 Brexit Votes, Construction Materials CAR Statistics 
 
 
Cumulative abnormal return starts with zero at 30 days before the event, which 
increases to -0.55% on the day of the event day of the event and drops down to -8,98 
% at 10 days after the event. Finally, it rises to -5,83 % 30 days after the event. This 
empirical analysis suggests that the event had an impact on the FTSE 350 Construction 
Materials index returns. However, the results have to be verified through hypothesis 
testing, where the null hypothesis is Cumulative Abnormal Return is equal to zero. 
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H0 =CAR= 0, Null hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero 
H1 = CAR ≠ 0, Alternate hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is not equal 
to zero 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 30 
day of following the event date to find -5,81 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 1,91 %. 
 
T Statistics has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as -3,04. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 0,25 % probability. As a 
result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 99% confidence interval and conclude that 
Cumulative Abnormal Return is significantly different than zero 
 
While analyzing the evolution of Cumulative abnormal returns following the event 
date, it has been observed that FTSE Banks had a peak cumulative abnormal return 10 
days after the event. Following this finding, the same study has been employed on 
FTSE Life Insurance index on the 10-day period. 
 
10 days observation period following to the event date ends on 07/07/2016 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
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An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 10 
day of following the event date to find -5,58 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 2,95 %. 
 
T Statistics’ has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as -1,89. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 4,58 % probability. As a 
result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 95% confidence interval and conclude that 
Cumulative Abnormal Return is significantly different than zero 
 
4.2.4. General Retailers 
Figure 4.2.4. 1  Brexit Votes, General Retailers CAR 
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Table 4.2.4. 1 Brexit Votes, General Retailers CAR Statistics 
 
 
Cumulative abnormal return starts with zero at 30 days before the event, which reduces 
to -1,57% on the day of the event and crashes -19,99% at 10 days after the event. 
Finally, it eases to -13,29 % 30 days after the event. This empirical analysis suggests 
that the event had an impact on the FTSE 350 General Retailers index returns. 
However, the results have to be verified through hypothesis testing, where the null 
hypothesis is Cumulative Abnormal Return is equal to zero. 
 
H0 =CAR= 0, Null hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero 
H1 = CAR ≠ 0, Alternate hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is not equal 
to zero 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 30 
day of following the event date to find -15,43 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 2,39 %. 
 
T Statistics has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as -6,45. 
 
30 DAYS 10 DAYS
AVERAGE -15.43% -16.55%
ST DEV S 2.39% 3.66%
TSTAT -6.45 -4.52
PROB 24x10
-8
% 0.07%
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Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 24x10-8 % probability.  
As a result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 99 % confidence interval and conclude 
that Cumulative Abnormal Return is significantly different than zero. 
 
While analyzing the evolution of Cumulative abnormal returns following the event 
date, it has been observed that FTSE Banks had a peak cumulative abnormal return 10 
days after the event. Following this finding, the same study has been employed on 
FTSE Life Insurance index on the 10-day period. 
 
10 days observation period following to the event date ends on 07/07/2016 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 10 
day of following the event date to find -16,55 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 3,66 %. 
 
T Statistics’ has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as -4,52. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 0,07 % probability.  As 
a result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 99 % confidence interval and conclude 
that Cumulative Abnormal Return is significantly different than zero. 
 
 
44 
 
4.2.5. Household Goods 
Figure 4.2.5. 1 Brexit Votes, Household Goods CAR 
 
 
Table 4.2.5. 1 Brexit Votes, Household Goods CAR Statistics 
 
 
Cumulative abnormal return starts with zero at 30 days before the event, which slightly 
decreases to 0,74% on the day of the event and drops down to -12,66 % at 10 days after 
the event. Finally, it rises to -12,59% 30 days after the event. This empirical analysis 
suggests that the event had an impact on the FTSE 350 Household Goods index returns. 
However, the results have to be verified through hypothesis testing, where the null 
hypothesis is Cumulative Abnormal Return is equal to zero. 
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H0 =CAR= 0, Null hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero 
H1 = CAR ≠ 0, Alternate hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is not equal 
to zero 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 30 
day of following the event date to find -11,25 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 1,09 %. 
 
T Statistics has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as -10,32. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 16x10-12 % probability.  
As a result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 99 % confidence interval and conclude 
that Cumulative Abnormal Return is significantly different than zero. 
 
While analyzing the evolution of Cumulative abnormal returns following the event 
date, it has been observed that FTSE Banks had a peak cumulative abnormal return 10 
days after the event. Following this finding, the same study has been employed on 
FTSE Life Insurance index on the 10-day period. 
 
10 days observation period following to the event date ends on 07/07/2016 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
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An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 10 
day of following the event date to find -10,87 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 1,57 %. 
 
T Statistics’ has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as -6,94. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 34x10-6 % probability.  
As a result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 99 % confidence interval and conclude 
that Cumulative Abnormal Return is significantly different than zero. 
 
4.2.6. Real-estate Investments  
Figure 4.2.6. 1 Brexit Votes, REIT CAR 
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Table 4.2.6. 1 Brexit Votes, REIT CAR Statistics 
 
 
Cumulative abnormal return starts with zero at 30 days before the event, which rose up 
to -1,38% on the day of the event drops to -24,22 % at 10 days after the event. Finally, 
it rose up to -14,27 % 30 days after the event. This empirical analysis suggests that the 
event had an impact on the FTSE 350 Reit index returns. However, the results have to 
be verified through hypothesis testing, where the null hypothesis is Cumulative 
Abnormal Return is equal to zero. 
 
H0 =CAR= 0, Null hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero 
H1 = CAR ≠ 0, Alternate hypothesis Cumulative abnormal return is not equal 
to zero 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 30 
day of following the event date to find -17,41 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 3,28 %. 
 
T Statistics has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as -5,31. 
 
30 DAYS 10 DAYS
AVERAGE -17.41% -19.68%
ST DEV S 3.28% 4.12%
TSTAT -5.31 -4.78
PROB 5x10
-6
% 0.05%
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Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 5x10-6 % probability.  As 
a result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 99 % confidence interval and conclude 
that Cumulative Abnormal Return is significantly different than zero. 
 
While analyzing the evolution of Cumulative abnormal returns following the event 
date, it has been observed that FTSE Banks had a peak cumulative abnormal return 10 
days after the event. Following this finding, the same study has been employed on 
FTSE Life Insurance index on the 10-day period. 
 
10 days observation period following to the event date ends on 07/07/2016 
 
In order to test our null hypothesis; 
 
An average of the cumulative abnormal return has been taken for the date after the 10 
day of following the event date to find -19,68 %.  
 
Standard deviation of the sample for the same period has been calculated as 4,12 %. 
 
T Statistics’ has been found by taking into account the average and standard deviation 
of the sample as -4,78. 
 
Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 0,05 % probability.  As 
a result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 99 % confidence interval and conclude 
that Cumulative Abnormal Return is significantly different than zero. 
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4.3 Comparison of Scottish Vote and Brexit findings 
 
In order to compare the impact of both events, a hypothesis test based on the difference 
of the cumulative abnormal returns of both events has been conducted. It has been 
assumed that, Brexit Referendum sample and Scottish Independence Vote sample are 
from the same population with different variances. As a result, a student t-test 
comparing two samples with different variances has been conducted.  
 
H0 =CARBrexit – CARScottish = 0, Null hypothesis 30-day Cumulative abnormal 
return of Brexit minus Cumulative abnormal return of Scottish Vote is equal to 
zero 
H1 = CARBrexit – CARScottish ≠ 0, Alternate hypothesis 30-day Cumulative 
abnormal return is not equal to zero 
 
t-statistic is calculated using the following formula where, X1 is the absolute value of 
CARBrexit and X2 is the absolute value of CARScottish, S1 is the standard deviation of 
CARBrexit and S2 is the standard deviation of CARScottish  
 
𝒕 =
(𝑿𝟏 − 𝑿𝟐) − (𝝁𝟏 − 𝝁𝟐)
(
𝒔𝟏
𝟐
𝒏𝟏
+
𝒔𝟐
𝟐
𝒏𝟐
)
𝟏/𝟐
 
 
Degrees of freedom (df) is calculated as  
𝒅𝒇 =
(
𝒔𝟏
𝟐
𝒏𝟏
+
𝒔𝟐
𝟐
𝒏𝟐
)
𝟐
(𝒔𝟏
𝟐/𝒏𝟏)
𝟐
𝒏𝟏
+
(𝒔𝟐
𝟐/𝒏𝟐)
𝟐
𝒏𝟐
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Using the above formulas, t-stat and the degrees of freedom are calculated as -2.06% 
and 51.38, respectively. Based on student t distribution calculated t statistic equates to 
97.8% probability.  As a result, we reject the null hypothesis with a 99% confidence 
interval and conclude that the difference between the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
of Brexit and Scottish Referendum is significantly different than zero.  
 
Table 4.3. 1 Scottish Votes, FTSE Sectors CAR 
 
 
Figure 4.3. 1 Scottish Votes, FTSE Sectors Car Analysis 
 
 
TICKER SECTORS CAR0 CAR10 CAR30 Sparkline
FTNMX8350 Banks 1.24% 2.55% 2.06%
FTNMX8570 Life Insurance 0.28% 1.62% 3.78%
FTNMX2350 Construction Materials 1.39% 1.58% -0.04%
FTNMX5370 General Retailers -0.60% -1.32% -0.54%
FTNMX3720 Household Goods 2.33% 2.20% 2.91%
FTNMX8670 REIT 0.24% 0.59% 5.45%
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When selected FTSE sectors are viewed side by side it gives a clearer indication that 
most of the sectors including Banking sector welcomed the Scottish remain vote with 
positive perspective. General Retailers sector was the only sector that has given a 
negative CAR during 30 days after the event date. 
 
Table 4.3. 2 Brexit Votes, FTSE Sectors CAR 
 
 
Figure 4.3. 2 Brexit Votes, FTSE Sectors CAR Analysis 
 
 
TICKER SECTORS CAR0 CAR10 CAR30 Sparkline
FTNMX8350 Banks 7.18% -9.31% -1.48%
FTNMX8570 Life Insurance 1.79% -18.70% -8.63%
FTNMX2350 Construction Materials -0.55% -8.98% -5.83%
FTNMX5370 General Retailers -1.57% -19.99% -13.29%
FTNMX3720 Household Goods -0.74% -12.66% -12.59%
FTNMX8670 REIT -1.38% -24.22% -14.27%
BREXIT VOTES, FTSE SECTORS CAR 
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Brexit Vote on the other hand provided banks a positive CAR on the day event however 
speedily retracted the returns to negative levels on CAR10 and CAR30. Apart from 
CAR0 of banks to be around 7.18% level the rest of the participants of the study showed 
negative CAR results. 
 
In a scenario where one considers both of the events as minor then a wider perspective 
can be given with the following results.  
 
Table 4.3. 3 Scottish Votes 3 Years CAR Analysis 
 
 
Life insurance had that the highest Average CAR with 26,86% on Scottish 3yr CAR 
Analysis. Banks were the lowest with 5,34%. 
 
Table 4.3. 4 Scottish Votes 3 Years CAR Analysis Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Standard deviation shows that Banks with 0.07 standard deviation is not as dispersed 
as the other sectors listed above. General Retailers and Construction Materials have 
standard deviations of 0.16, which is the highest in the sample. 
TICKER SECTORS AVERAGE ST DEV S TSTAT PROB
FTNMX8350 Banks 5.34% 0.071 0.75 77.32%
FTNMX8570 Life Insurance 25.20% 0.134 1.88 96.99%
FTNMX2350 Construction Materials 7.56% 0.071 1.06 85.57%
FTNMX5370 General Retailers 21.92% 0.159 1.38 91.59%
FTNMX3720 Household Goods 26.86% 0.161 1.67 95.23%
FTNMX8670 REIT 10.83% 0.091 1.19 88.28%
SCOTTISH 3YR CAR ANALYSIS
SCOTTISH 3YR CAR ANALYSIS
Descriptive Statistics
Mean 5.34% 25.20% 7.56% 21.92% 26.86% 10.83%
Standard Deviation 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.16 0.16 0.09
Banks Life Insurance
Construction 
Materials
General 
Retailers
Household 
Goods
REIT
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Table 4.3. 5 Brexit Votes 3 Years CAR Analysis 
 
 
Household goods have that the highest Average CAR with 26,16% on Brexit 3yr CAR 
Analysis. Banks were the lowest with 3,82%. 
 
Table 4.3. 6 Brexit Votes 3 Years CAR Analysis Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Standard deviation shows that Banks with 0.06 standard deviation is not as dispersed 
as the other sectors listed above. Household Goods had standard deviations of 0.19 
which is the highest in the sample. 
 
Due to the fact that both events cover different date interval, a comparison has been 
made on the 3 years before event date plus 30 days. Findings show, average CAR of 
Banks were 5.34% on Scottish Vote era whereas on Brexit era it dropped to 3.82%. 
From Scottish Vote era to Brexit era; Life Insurance dropped from 25.20% to14.76%, 
Construction Materials rose from 7.56% to 16.07%, General Retailers decreased from 
21.92% to 10.56%, Household Goods from slightly decreased from 26.86% to 26.16% 
and REIT rose from 10.83% to 22.02%. 
TICKER SECTORS AVERAGE ST DEV S TSTAT PROB
FTNMX8350 Banks 3.82% 0.061 0.63 73.50%
FTNMX8570 Life Insurance 14.76% 0.084 1.75 95.95%
FTNMX2350 Construction Materials 16.07% 0.139 1.16 87.62%
FTNMX5370 General Retailers 10.56% 0.078 1.35 91.08%
FTNMX3720 Household Goods 26.16% 0.194 1.35 91.14%
FTNMX8670 REIT 22.02% 0.121 1.82 96.54%
BREXIT 3YR CAR ANALYSIS
BREXIT 3YR CAR ANALYSIS
Descriptive Statistics
Mean 3.82% 14.76% 16.07% 10.56% 26.16% 22.02%
Standard Deviation 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.19 0.12
Banks Life Insurance
Construction 
Materials
General 
Retailers
Household 
Goods
REIT
54 
 
Table 4.3. 7 Scottish Votes, 3 Years vs 30 Days CAR Analysis 
 
 
Banks had an average CAR of 5.34% including the Scottish Vote but when Scottish 
vote event date plus 30 days is analyzed it can be seen that this average is dropped to 
3.70%. It is visible that Banking sector was affected less than the other sectors. REIT 
on the other hand showed an increase return from 10.83% to 20.07%. 
 
Table 4.3. 8 Brexit Votes, 3 Years vs 30 Days CAR Analysis 
 
 
Banks had an average CAR of 3.82% including the Brexit Vote but when Brexit vote 
event date plus 30 days is analyzed it can be seen that this average is dropped to -4.80%. 
It is visible that all the sectors on the Table 4.3.8 has been severely affected from Brexit. 
 
When Banking sector is analyzed using Scottish and Brexit Vote 3 years and event 
period plus 30 days, the affects become clearer. In the 3 year prior to Scottish Vote 
TICKER SECTORS 3YR AV 30 DAY AV
FTNMX8350 Banks 5.34% 3.70%
FTNMX8570 Life Insurance 25.20% 2.09%
FTNMX2350 Construction Materials 7.56% 0.01%
FTNMX5370 General Retailers 21.92% -0.52%
FTNMX3720 Household Goods 26.86% 2.06%
FTNMX8670 REIT 10.83% 20.07%
SCOTTISH 3YR vs 30 DAYS CAR ANALYSIS
TICKER SECTORS 3YR AV 30 DAY AV
FTNMX8350 Banks 3.82% -4.80%
FTNMX8570 Life Insurance 14.76% -12.47%
FTNMX2350 Construction Materials 16.07% -5.81%
FTNMX5370 General Retailers 10.56% -15.53%
FTNMX3720 Household Goods 26.16% -11.25%
FTNMX8670 REIT 22.02% -17.42%
BREXIT 3YR vs 30 DAYS CAR ANALYSIS
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event date plus 30 days, Banks had a 3 years Car of 5,34% but when this number drops 
to 3.82% on 3 year prior to Brexit Vote event date plus 30 days period. These can be 
also seen on the 30 days after event dates. Banks had a CAR of 3,70% on 30 days after 
Scottish Vote whereas on the other hand Banks had a CAR of -4,80% on 30 days after 
the Brexit Votes. 
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CONCLUSION 
Through the findings of this paper, it is visible that UK had a clearly rough time with 
its referendum as compared to Scottish Vote. The power struggle between yes 
campaigners who believe Britain should leave European Union and no campaigners 
who believe Britain should stay in the European Union is still going on 3 years after 
the event date. Scotland on the other hand embraced the remain vote during these 3 
years only to ignite it again just recently in 2019. 
The main hypothesis in this paper is whether political events such as Brexit and the 
Scottish Referendum have any statistically significant impact on financial markets. As 
summarized in the literature review, there have been many event studies based on 
economic and political paradigm shifts in different countries and empirical research 
suggests that these events have an impact on financial markets. In order to see whether 
Brexit or the Scottish Referendum had any impact on the financial markets, cumulative 
abnormal returns for FTSE 350 Banks Index have been calculated before and after 
these milestone events. The empirical results show that Brexit had a statistically 
significant negative impact on the market performance of the FTSE 350 Banks Index 
relative to the benchmark index performance. Similarly, the Scottish Referendum had 
a statistically significant positive impact on the same index, though at different times 
and with different magnitudes. A comparison between the two referendum shows that 
markets tend to react more to negative events such as Brexit as evidenced by a higher 
impact on cumulative abnormal returns. A study of 3 years analysis prior to event dates 
plus 30 days has been studied and found out that these averages were different in during 
these event periods. Scottish Vote era had a higher average CAR compared to Brexit 
era. Scottish remain was considered as positive addition and did not affect returns 
following the event date as severely as the leave outcome of Brexit which pushed the 
positive 3-year average of 3.82% to -4.80%. 
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In order to demonstrated the effects of both events on other five sectors such as Life 
insurance, Construction Materials, General Retailers, Household Goods and REITs. 
These sectors have naturally not been immune to these events. Some sectors had bigger 
hits then Banking sector during event window and after. Further study on this subject 
could look at the performance of these industries in the 3 years following the Brexit 
Vote which at the time of writing has been not finalized.  
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